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I. Introduction
In theory, domestic workers and sex workers are at greater risk of gender-based
violence because they work in private places, away from the public eye. That narrative
implicitly assumes that the legal system would protect sex workers and domestic workers
from acts of violence if they were less "hidden" from public view. This paper challenges
that assumption in the context of Hong Kong, a former British colony that is now a
Special Administrative Region of China. I argue that the state upholds laws and policies
that make sex workers and migrant domestic workers highly vulnerable to violence, both
physical and structural. This connection between violence and state action is not hidden
but rather has been documented and widely discussed in public forums, not only in Hong
Kong but also at the international level. Nonetheless, the Hong Kong government
continues to resist fairly simple reforms that might empower these women and enable
them to better protect themselves. The question presented by this research project is
whether sex workers and migrant domestic workers are deliberately being "left out" of
Hong Kong's human rights framework and, if so, why? It is tempting to conclude that
they have been excluded from law reform simply because they represent the "other" - sex
workers are widely disapproved of in Hong Kong and migrant domestic workers are
predominantly Filipino and Indonesian, thus ethnically different from the Hong Kong
Chinese majority. However, I argue that these women are further marginalized by their
awkward position within two very contentious debates in Hong Kong - one on the
question of whether the sex industry should be further decriminalized and one on the
question of migrant labor. Although the political compromises that have been forged are
apparently "acceptable" (and perhaps even desirable) to the majority of Hong Kong
people, they expose the workers to unnecessary dangers and hardship.
Hong Kong provides an interesting case study, partly because of its multicultural
and international influences. It is a predominantly Chinese territory but inherited a
common law legal system from the United Kingdom, including an independent judiciary
and a commitment to procedural justice. The women's movement achieved significant
law reform during the transition period leading to the resumption of Chinese sovereignty
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(1984-1997), a period of increased democracy and concern for human rights. 1 Law
reform and jurisprudence in Hong Kong has also been strongly influenced by
international human rights treaties.2 Although Hong Kong is now a part of China, the
local government still prepares a separate report for each United Nations human rights
treaty that applies to Hong Kong and the relevant UN committees issue Concluding
Observations that are specific to Hong Kong. Local leaders are anxious to demonstrate
that human rights are still protected in Hong Kong and often undertake reforms to comply
with these Concluding Observations.
Part II of the paper briefly reviews Hong Kong's general approach to human
rights, gender equality, and violence against women. It demonstrates that the Hong Kong
government does consider violence against women to be an issue worthy of attention and
believes that law has a role to play in preventing and remedying gender-based violence.
Part III of the paper then presents the research results concerning sex workers in Hong
Kong and the reasons why the current legal framework makes them particularly
vulnerable to violence. Part IV analyzes the situation of migrant domestic workers, who
are legally required to live with their employers and severely penalized if they resign or
are fired before the end of their two-year contract. The paper concludes, in Part V, by
considering why the government has been so reluctant to adopt law reform that might
make these two groups of women safer in their working lives.
H. Preventing Gender Discrimination and Gender-based Violence in Hong Kong
Given its level of economic development, Hong Kong entered the field of anti-
discrimination law rather late. This was partly due to its colonial history, which was
inherently undemocratic and institutionalised inequality.3 Although the United Kingdom
enacted its first law prohibiting sex discrimination in 1967, the Hong Kong colonial
government initially had little interest in following that example. Colonial officials argued
that a law prohibiting gender discrimination would burden the influential business
community and might also conflict with traditional Chinese cultural practices. In fact the
Hong Kong government itself maintained a number of laws and policies that discriminated
against women, including a prohibition on female inheritance of land.4
'See generally Eliza Lee, ed, GENDER AND CHANGE IN HONG KONG: GLOBALIZATION,
POSTCOLONIALISM, AND CHINESE PATRIARCHY (University of British Columbia Press,
2003).
2 Carole J. Petersen, Embracing Universal Standards? The Role of International Human
Rights Treaties in Hong Kong's Constitutional Jurisprudence, in Fu Hualing, Lison
Harris, and Simon N. M. Young, eds, INTERPRETING HONG KONG'S BASIC LAW: THE
STRUGGLE FOR COHERENCE (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
3Harriet Samuels, Women and the Law in Hong Kong: A Feminist Analysis, in Raymond
Wacks, ed., HONG KONG, CHINA AND 1997: ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY (HKU Press 1993).
4 Carole J. Petersen, Equality as a Human Right: The Development ofAnti-Discrimination
Law in Hong Kong (1996) 34 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 335. The
prohibition on female inheritance was finally repealed in 1994.
2
The transition period leading to Hong Kong's return to China (1984-1997) gave
women and human rights organizations the perfect opportunity to lobby for law reform. The
Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 (the treaty by which the British government agreed to
return Hong Kong to China in 1997) provided for the continued application of international
human rights treaties to Hong Kong, including the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR). In 1989, in an effort to boost public confidence after the June 4th
crackdown in Beijing, the colonial government proposed a Hong Kong Bill of Rights.
Enacted in 1991, the Bill of Rights Ordinance was essentially copied from the ICCPR,
which contains three articles prohibiting discrimination. Although the Bill of Rights itself
was confined to the public sector, the women's movement used the legislative debate on it
to raise awareness of gender discrimination in general. This was significant because limited
democracy was also being introduced, in preparation for the end of colonial rule and the
Legislative Council was becoming more accountable to the public. In December 1992,
legislator Emily Lau successfully introduced a motion calling for the extension of the UN
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
to Hong Kong. The government initially resisted but agreed to initiate the first public
consultation on sex discrimination and the results were overwhelmingly in favour of
accepting CEDAW and adopting domestic sex discrimination legislation. Later that year,
legislator Anna Wu introduced the Equal Opportunities Bill, which sought to prohibit
discrimination on a wide range of grounds (including sex, marital status, pregnancy,
disability, sexuality, race, and age). Under pressure, the government abandoned its
longstanding opposition to anti-discrimination legislation and introduced two narrower
compromise bills, the Sex Discrimination Bill and the Disability Discrimination Bill. The
two laws were enacted in the summer of 1995 and brought into force in late 1996.s
The Sex Discrimination Ordinance (SDO) is largely based upon the British Sex
Discrimination Act 1975, although certain provisions were borrowed from Australian
federal law and Anna Wu's Equal Opportunities Bill (which was based upon Western
Australian law).6 The SDO prohibits both sex discrimination and sexual harassment and
there is no need for the plaintiff to prove that the harassment was discriminatory.7 The
legislature also created the Hong Kong Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC), which is
an independent body but funded by the government. Although the EOC's primary
enforcement mechanism is the power to investigate and conciliate complaints, it has also
litigated some important cases.8 In one high-profile action for judicial review, the Court of
First Instance used CEDAW as a guide to interpreting the SDO and then held that the
5This section is summarized from Petersen, n. 4 above.
6For further discussion of the substantive provisions of Hong Kong's anti-discrimination
laws, see Carole J. Petersen, Equal Opportunities: a New Field ofLaw for Hong Kong, in
Raymond Wacks, ed., THE NEW LEGAL ORDER IN HONG KONG (HKU Press, 1999).
7Carole J. Petersen, Negotiating Respect: Sexual Harassment and the Law in Hong Kong, 7
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 127-168 (2005).
8Carole J. Petersen, Stuck on Formalities? A Critique of Hong Kong's Legal Framework
for Gender Equality, in Fanny M. Cheung and Eleanor Holroyd, eds, MAINSTREAMING
GENDER IN HONG KONG SOCIETY (Chinese University Press, 2009).
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government's system of allocating students to prestigious secondary schools unlawfully
discriminated against girls. .
As an appointed government, the Hong Kong government is continually battling to
demonstrate its legitimacy to the people and to the international community. One way
that it seeks to do so is by participating actively in the reporting process for the UN
human rights treaties that apply to Hong Kong and responding to at least some
recommendations of treaty bodies, so as to obtain a reasonably positive human rights
"report card" at every review. While the most influential treaty is unquestionably the
ICCPR (because it has been largely incorporated into domestic law), other treaties have
also had an impact on law and policy. For example, the Hong Kong government changed
its screening mechanisms for potential victims of torture to comply with its obligation,
under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), not to deport a person back to a country
where she would be at risk of being tortured.' 0 The government also finally introduced a
bill (albeit a weak bill) to prohibit race discrimination, at least in part because of repeated
urging by the Committee on the Elimination of Race Discrimination.II
There is little doubt that this approach to international treaties has benefited Hong
Kong residents generally, allowing them to maintain a higher degree of civil liberties than
residents of Mainland China.12 Hong Kong laws prohibiting gender discrimination and
gender-based violence are also stronger and more enforceable than comparable
legislation in Mainland China. Women activists in Hong Kong enjoy freedom of speech,
association, and assembly and therefore active in policy debates. Women's organizations
frequently make submissions to the executive branch and to the Legislative Council.
They also regularly submit "alternative reports" (also referred to as "shadow reports") to
9For discussion of the case and the general impact of CEDAW in Hong Kong, see Carole
J. Petersen and Harriet Samuels, The International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women: A Comparison of Its Implementation and the
Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the United Kingdom and Hong Kong, 26
HASTINGS INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEw 1-50 (2002).
'
0Written replies by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to the list of issues
(CAT/C/HKG/Q/4) to be taken up in connection with the consideration of the fourth
periodic report of Hong Kong to the Committee Against Torture (CAT/C/HKG/4), Sept.
26, 2008, paras 39-45.
"For the history of the CERD Committee's input, see Kelley Loper, One Step Forward,
Two Steps Back? The Dilemma of Hong Kong's Draft Race Discrimination Legislation,
38 HONG KONG LAW JOURNAL 15 (2008); and Carole J. Petersen, Racial Equality and the
Law: Creating an Effective Statute and Enforcement Model for Hong Kong, 34 HONG KONG
LAW JOURNAL 459 (2004).
12Compare the chapter on Hong Kong with the chapter on China in Randall Peerenboom,
Carole J. Petersen, and Albert H. Y. Chen, eds., HUMAN RIGHTS IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE
LEGAL STUDY OF TWELVE ASIAN JURISDICTIONS, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED STATES
(Routledge 2006).
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the UN human rights treaty-monitoring bodies, to ensure that the government report does
not gloss over human rights violations. Although they lack the power to vote out the
executive branch, local women's organizations recognize that the government cares about
the Concluding Observations of the international treaty-monitoring bodies and they use
the reporting process as a mechanism for applying pressure.
The influence of the treaties and the government's desire to please treaty-
monitoring bodies is apparent in some of Hong Kong's law reform related to gender-
based violence. For example, in 2001 the government introduced legislation to expressly
prohibit marital rape, in direct response to the CEDAW Committee's comment in 1999 that
the law was not sufficiently clear on this point.13 The Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights welcomed this development in its review of Hong Kong in 2005.14 More
recently, Hong Kong expanded the scope of the Domestic Violence Ordinance (originally
enacted in 1996) so as to cover violent acts within a broader range of intimate and family
relationships and to empower the court to require abusers to attend an anti-violence
behavior program.' 5 When the Committee Against Torture reviewed Hong Kong in late
2008, the government described this legislation (enacted in June 2008) and several new
programs designed to prevent domestic violence, including training packages for
frontline police officers and alternative housing for victims. This year the Hong Kong
Women's Commission (which was established in part because of recommendations of the
CEDAW Committee) has also launched a large program to reduce the incidence of
domestic violence. The government also introduced, in 2009, an additional bill to further
expand the coverage of the Domestic Violence Ordinance, this time to include same-sex
relationships.16
This is a fairly condensed summary of the relevant law reform in Hong Kong but
should demonstrate two points: (1) the Hong Kong government and Legislative Council are
willing to adopt legal and policy reforms to address violence against women (particularly
domestic violence); and (2) the unelected government pays attention to recommendations of
international human rights bodies when considering what reforms to adopt. However, as
demonstrated in the next two sections, the response has been rather different when it comes
to violence experienced by sex workers and migrant domestic workers. This is not because
the violence has not been exposed or publicly debated. It has been discussed in many public
13Petersen, n. 4 above.
14Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on
the People's Republic of China (including Hong Kong and Macao), May 13, 2005, para
75.
'
5The legislation and records of the discussion leading to its enactment in 2008 are
available on the website of the Legislative Council's Bills Committee to Study the
Domestic Violence (Amendment) Bill 2007, at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-
07/english/bc/bc6l/general/bc6l.htm (visited Oct. 20, 2009).
16The legislation and relevant papers are available on the website of the Legislative
Council's Bills Committee to Study the Domestic Violence (Amendment) Bill 2009, at
http://www.legco.gov.hk/english/index.htm (visited Oct. 20, 2009).
5
forums, including reviews by international treaty bodies. However, Hong Kong appears less
interested in reforms that might make these women safer in their working lives.
I. Sex Workers: Dangers of the One-Woman Brothel System
Sex work presents difficult issues for feminist theory.' 7 Some feminists argue for
complete abolition on the ground that sex work is inherently violent and exploitative. The
model adopted by Sweden (which prohibits the buying rather than the selling of sex) is
often proposed as a means of abolishing the sex industry without punishing sex
workers. In Hong Kong, sex worker organizations take a labor-rights perspective and
argue that sex work should be legalized, enabling women to form labor unions, enforce
contracts, and hire security guards to protect them from dangerous clients. The Hong
Kong government does not seem to know which approach it prefers. The legal system
has settled on an awkward compromise between abolitionist and labor-rights positions,
one that arguably heightens the risk of violence in an already a dangerous profession. In
essence, sex work is not prohibited in Hong Kong if a local woman practices in a "one-
woman brothel" and is careful not to advertise or solicit clients. Although Hong Kong is
not really a destination for "sex tourism" (because it is a fairly expensive place to visit
relative to other South East Asian counties), the domestic demand for commercial sex is
fairly strong. One survey reported that one in seven Hong Kong men made at least one
visit to a sex worker in a six-month period. 19
My research into sex workers in Hong Kong initially focused on migrant sex
workers because it was part of a group research project on trafficking of women into
Hong Kong. In essence, we obtained permission to interview a sample of Mainland
Chinese women who had been incarcerated in Hong Kong prisons for offenses related to
alleged sex work. Before 1997, Mainland Chinese women were fairly rare in Hong
Kong's sex industry. However, according to immigration authorities, they now represent
more than 90% of the women arrested for suspected involvement in sex work. Although
the immigration border is still tightly regulated, it has become much easier in recent years
for Mainland Chinese to obtain a visa to enter Hong Kong, either for tourism or to visit
relatives. But women from Mainland China cannot legally work in Hong Kong without a
work visa, which they cannot obtain for sex work.
17For a small sample of the rich literature on this topic, see the essays written by Judith R.
Walkawitz, Lars 0. Ericsson, Carole Pateman, Catharine MacKinnon, Jody Freeman,
Mary Joe Frug, and Margaret A. Baldwin, all published in D. Kelly Weisberg, ed.,
APPLICATIONS OF FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY TO WOMEN'S LIVES: SEX, VIOLENCE, WORK
AND REPRODUCTION (Temple University Press, 1996) 187-261.
18 For a positive view on this law, see Gunilla Ekberg, The Swedish Law That Prohibits
the Purchase of Sexual Services: Best Practices for Prevention of Prostitution and
Trafficking in Human Beings, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1187 (2004).
19SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, May 26, 1999, p. 3.
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Mainland Chinese women who are apprehended by immigration officials on
suspicion of sex work are sometimes simply returned to China (with the understanding
that they will be banned from visiting Hong Kong for a period of time). However, large
numbers of women are apprehended by police officers in "sting" operations, after which
they are prosecuted, convicted, and incarcerated. In 2005, almost 12,000 women from
Mainland China were admitted to Hong Kong prisons, representing about three-quarters
of the female prison population. Although the percentage has dropped somewhat in the
past few years, the Hong Kong government recently told the UN Committee Against
Torture that it incarcerated approximately 9,400 Mainland Chinese women in 2007,
representing about half of Hong Kong's female prison population.2 0
We interviewed 75 of these women through an interpreter and obtained 58 valid
interviews. Their stories revealed that the majority of these women are poor, have little
formal education, and were ill informed regarding Hong Kong law. Many had been
recruited by people who promised them other types of jobs or who told them that sex
work was legal in Hong Kong (which is not the case for migrant women). Their stories
also documented a highly standardized criminal justice system, one that is designed to
convict migrant sex workers as quickly and efficiently as possible. We confirmed these
findings by conducting court observations, which showed that women are often tried in
groups and that it takes an average of about 3 minutes to convict a migrant woman
accused of engaging in sex work. Our first article from the study questioned the policy
reasons for incarcerating such a large number of women, at an estimated annual cost of
about 20 million US dollars.21 Although we found a few sympathetic magistrates (who
told us, off the record, that they would prefer to give these women suspended sentences),
the government officials apparently believe that harsh punishment is the only effective
way to deter women from entering Hong Kong for the purposes of sex work.
The second article from our study examined whether Hong Kong police,
immigration officials, and judges take adequate steps to identify potential victims of
trafficking.22 We had noted that the Hong Kong government only rarely identifies a
woman as a victim of sex trafficking. Given the huge increase in the number of Mainland
Chinese women coming to Hong Kong for sex work (many of them very young and
working under third-party management), we were surprised to find no corresponding
increase in the number of women identified as victims of trafficking. From 2000-2006,
20Written replies by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to the list of issues
(CAT/C/HKG/Q/4) to be taken up in connection with the consideration of the fourth
periodic report of Hong Kong to the Committee Against Torture (CAT/C/HKG/4), Sept.
26, 2008, paras 108-109.
21See Karen Joe Laidler, Carole J. Petersen, and Robyn Emerton, Bureaucratic Justice: The
Incarceration of Mainland Chinese Women Working in Hong Kong's Sex Industry, 51 (1)
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF OFFENDER THERAPY AND COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 52
(2007).
22See Robyn Emerton, Karen Joe Laidler, and Carole J. Petersen, Trafficking of Mainland
Chinese Women Into Hong Kong's Sex Industry: Problems ofIdentification and Response, 2
AsIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE LAw 35 (2007).
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48,026 migrant women were arrested in Hong Kong for suspected involvement in
prostitution but only 36 (0.07%) had been identified as victims of trafficking. This
seemed remarkably low to us.
Based upon our interviewees' accounts, 12 of the 58 women in our study (21%)
should have been considered "victims of trafficking" under the international definition of
the term. Yet none of these 12 women had been identified as such by the Hong Kong
authorities. We concluded that this is partly because Hong Kong does not have a legal
definition of "trafficking victim" but also because the criminal justice system moves with
lightening speed and encourages women to plead guilty, so as to obtain a lighter sentence.
As a result, women have little opportunity to tell their stories and are actively
discouraged from doing so. Our study cast doubt on the standards and methodology that
the US Department of State uses in its annual Trafficking in Persons Report, which has
consistently placed Hong Kong in "tier 1" on the grounds that it implements strong anti-
trafficking measures and assists and protects trafficking victims.
The women who we classified as victims of trafficking had generally been lured
to Hong Kong by false promises of jobs outside the sex industry. Some were incredibly
naYve and thought that they were working with a legitimate visa, which they willingly
showed to the police or immigration officials when apprehended. One of our interviewees
was only 15, which is below the age of consent for sexual intercourse in Hong Kong.
Some reported harrowing stories of being locked up in apartments on their arrival in
Hong Kong and threatened if they did not agree to do sex work. However, from the point
of view of the police and many government officials, our interviewees were not victims
of violence or coercion but rather willing violators of immigration law. In discussing our
research results, it became clear that many Hong Kong officials (and perhaps the general
public) had little sympathy for these women. It was often pointed out to me that the
punishment these women receive is not a condemnation of the nature of their work, but
rather punishment for their intentional violation of immigration law. This has also been
put forth as a justification for counseling young defendants to plead guilty: telling the
judge that they intended to be a dishwasher rather than a sex worker would not constitute
a defense to the charge of "breach of condition of stay" because any form of work would
violate immigration law. And once that "guilt" is established, their experiences of
violence became fairly irrelevant. Some interviewees even claimed that they were
ignored when they tried to tell police about a friend or relative who was still being held
by a brothel manager.
This community response to our research has led me to look more closely at the
treatment of Hong Kong's local sex workers, to investigate whether violence against
them is perceived any differently. In theory, local Hong Kong women do have a right to
engage in sex work and so one might assume that they would be in a better position than
migrant sex workers. However, the profession is regulated so tightly that almost
everything related to sex work is prohibited, including: soliciting for an immoral
purpose;2 putting up public signs advertising prostitution;24 and running a vice
23Crimes Ordinance, Laws of Hong Kong, Chapter 200, s. 147.
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establishment. 25 The term "vice establishment" is interpreted broadly, so as to include the
use of premises "wholly or mainly" by two or more persons for the purpose of
prostitution.26 This means that if two women share an apartment for sex work, they can
be convicted of running a vice establishment, which makes them liable for imprisonment
of up to ten years. A sex worker also may not employ a security guard or other assistant
because that person would be guilty of the offense of "knowingly liv[ing] wholly or in
part on the earnings of prostitution of another". 27 Thus, sex work is only legal in Hong
Kong if it is conducted in a one-woman brothel and if the sex worker is careful not to
solicit or advertise in public.
Local sex worker organizations and advocacy groups have argued, for many
years, that these extensive criminal offences make sex workers more vulnerable to
violence by (1) giving police an excuse to harass sex workers through undercover
operations, which can lead directly to arrest, intrusive body searches, and other abuse;
and (2) compelling women to work alone and without protection, in some cases leading
to violent attacks and even murder. The remainder of this section of the paper provides a
few examples of how the legal restrictions expose sex workers to violence and the
strategies that sex workers and their supporters have adopted to lobby for law reform.
One of the primary complaints of local sex workers in Hong Kong is that police
adopt elaborate undercover operations, in which officers receive sexual services from
women in order to gain evidence against them. About four years ago, one particularly
active sex worker group, Zi Teng, went public with its complaint that undercover agents
were entrapping sex workers and receiving free sexual services in the process. Their
members felt particularly enraged that undercover officers were receiving services under
false pretences, then "zipping up" and promptly making an arrest. Zi Teng also claimed
that sex workers were being subjected to humiliating body searches and threatened by
police once they were taken to the station, in an effort to persuade them to simply confess
to illegal acts and save the police the trouble of a prosecution (an allegation that has been
denied by the Hong Kong government).
Although a little embarrassed by the public disclosure that its undercover agents
were obtaining free sexual services, the Hong Kong government did not put an end to it.
Rather it defended the practice, insisting that police officers were only receiving
masturbation services (not intercourse or oral sex) and that this service was sometimes
necessary in order for the police to obtain evidence. After all, the government argued,
how can we obtain evidence that premises are being used as a "vice establishment" unless
the officer can testify that he received sexual services there? Not satisfied by this
response, Zi Teng sought legal advice from Simon Young, a law professor at the
University of Hong Kong who also has prosecutorial experience in Canada. Young
produced a detailed written opinion stating that the practice of receiving sexual services
24 bid, s. 147A.
25 Ibid, s. 139.
26 Ibid, s. 117 (3).
27 Ibid, s. 137.
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was unlikely to be necessary except in rare circumstances (e.g. if an officer risked losing
his cover and being injured if he declined services) and that many other jurisdictions did
not allow it. He also argued that there were serious ethical and legal reasons why the
police should not pursue this as a strategy. For example, the agent might run the risk of
having a sexual encounter with someone below the age of consent.
Although the Hong Kong government has not backed down from its position on
undercover operations, it appears that Zi Teng's complaints and Professor Young's legal
opinion have had at least some limited impact. The Legislative Council's Security Panel
took an interest in the complaint and asked the government to provide information on the
number of times that sexual services were being received. The government only recently
started to provide this information (in late 2008) but it appears that the occasions are now
fairly rare. The government reported that the police had revised their internal guidelines
on anti-vice operations and- that officers at the rank of Deputy District Commander or
Senior Superintendent are now given a more "active role" in supervising undercover
operations, with more "vigorous control" over the scope and extent of the evidence to be
gathered, including the extent of body contact with sex workers. As these guidelines were
only adopted in 2007, they were almost certainly inspired by Zi Teng's complaint and
Professor Young's legal opinion of 2006.28 The government also assured legislators that
the revised guidelines would "reinforce" the principle that undercover officers are not
allowed to receive oral sex or sexual intercourse from sex workers, a principle that was
often breached according to sex workers. The government has also recently released new
guidelines on searching sex workers and other people held in detention. The humiliating
strip searches and "body cavity" searches are still occurring but are hopefully being
conducted with more sensitivity and care than in the past. 29
However, guidelines are not the same as law reform and they fall well short of
what Zi Teng and its supporting organizations, such as Action for Reach Out, have been
seeking. The police and correctional service officers still have enormous discretion in
deciding how to treat sex workers. Sex worker groups are therefore lobbying for full (or
at least greater) legalization of sex work, which would give the police fewer excuses to
entrap, detain, search, and prosecute sex workers.
In additional to less violence at the hands of the police, sex workers argue that
legalization would give them more power to defend themselves against criminals and
violent customers. Under the present legal framework, the only way that a sex worker can
avoid breaking the law (and being harassed by the police) is by working entirely alone in
28Letter from Security Bureau to Raymond Lam, Clerk to the Legislative Council's Panel
on Security, Dec. 8, 2008, LC Paper No. CB(2)417/08-09(02) available at:
http://www.legco.gov.hk/vr0809/english/panels/se/se phsw/papers/se phswl209cb2-
417-2-e.pdf (visited Oct. 20, 2009).
29Written replies by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to the list of issues
(CAT/C/HKG/Q/4) to be taken up in connection with the consideration of the fourth
periodic report of Hong Kong to the Committee Against Torture (CAT/C/HKG/4), Sept.
26, 2008, paras 124-128.
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her own apartment. Naturally, this makes a woman highly vulnerable to violent attack.
This argument gained strength in the past year because a man was convicted (in July
2009) of three consecutive murders of sex workers, all in one-woman brothels. Another
defendant was convicted of murdering a young girl engaged in "compensated dating", a
recent phenomena that is generating substantial public debate in Hong Kong. These trials
attracted significant public attention and sex worker organizations intensified their
campaigns, attracting some support in the Hong Kong legislature and in the press. Action
for Reach Out has established an on-line petition to gain support for removing the ban on
two-women brothels (which can be signed at: http://www.afro.org.hk/EN/). But the
government continues to oppose any substantive law reform, maintaining that the "one-
woman brothel" policy is a reasonable compromise between those who would prefer
absolute prohibition of prostitution and those who seek full legalization. Meanwhile, sex
workers who decide to violate the law by working together (or by hiring a security card)
risk being targeted in undercover operations.
In this particular area, it appears that the interest of international human rights
bodies has had relatively little impact. In 2008, the Committee Against Torture asked the
Hong Kong government to supplement its report by -commenting on sex worker
complaints of "treatment received during both undercover operations and in
investigations and interrogations, including allegations of unnecessary and intrusive strip
searches and the reported receiving of free sexual services by the police". 30 The Hong
Kong government did respond at length, primarily by describing the "safeguards" that are
in place to prevent abuse by the police. But did not give much ground on the
fundamental point of dispute, insisting that there is an "operational need for the police to
conduct covert operations in order to collect the necessary evidence for charging vice-
operators." 3 1 It also assured the Committee that any person aggrieved by a police action,
including anti-vice operations and body searches, is free to lodge complaints. The police
apparently did not bother to keep statistics of complaints statistics until January 2007. By
May 2008, 34 formal complaints had been received from sex workers or sex worker
associations but the government's position, before the Committee Against Torture, was
that none of the complaints had been substantiated. 32
It is clear from the press coverage and discussions in the legislature that there has
been an active debate in the past four years on how to prevent violence against women
working in the sex industry. But it is also clear that even minor changes to the law (such as a
allowing several sex workers to work together or to hire a security guard) would probably be
opposed by the government. The government probably realizes that the current legal
framework is problematic but also knows that any law reform proposal (whether toward
legalization or abolition) would generate substantial opposition. Those who oppose sex
work would strongly oppose giving the industry any more "legal space" while those who
purchase sex (or believe that women should be entitled to sell it) want to keep it at least
marginally legal. The majority may prefer to live with the existing legal compromise rather
11
30 bid Question 27.
31Ibid. para 133.32Ibid para 139.
than commencing a law reform exercise that could lead to an outcome they do not support.
Meanwhile, the sex workers remain in legal limbo, an unacceptably dangerous position.
IV. Migrant domestic workers in Hong Kong
The Hong Kong government refers to migrant domestic workers rather
pejoratively as "foreign domestic helpers". On the surface these women would appear to
have little in common with sex workers. They are completely "legal" and come to Hong
Kong as part of a government-approved program, with a standard contract that purports
to value their work and protect their rights. Although employed in Hong Kong since the
mid-1970s, it was in the mid-1980s that they began to play a really important role in
Hong Kong's economy. They grew from 1% of Hong Kong's labor force in 1982 to 7%
in 2001. By 2005 more than 222,500 migrant domestic workers were working in Hong
Kong. The Philippines has traditionally been the main country of origin but that is
gradually changing, with an increasing number of women coming from Indonesia. In
2005, approximately 118,400 (53%) came from the Philippines and 95,700 (43%) came
from Indonesia.3 3
In theory, migrant domestic workers are free to file complaints against their
employers and some abusive employers have been prosecuted. In practice, however, it is
extremely difficult to purse a complaint and the legal remedies are rarely effective. In
order to understand how this occurs, it is necessary to understand the relationship
between immigration law and labor law in Hong Kong. The "foreign domestic helper"
program is administered jointly by the Immigration Department and the Labour
Department. The Immigration Ordinance sets forth the conditions of stay and excludes
migrant domestic workers from ever acquiring the "right of abode" (similar to permanent
residence) in Hong Kong. The Immigration Department issues the work visa but only
after the prospective employer and employee have entered into the standard form
contract. 34 Under that contract, a migrant domestic worker is obligated to live with her
employer 3 5 and to work up to six days per week, with no maximum number of daily
33For population trends and a general background on the migrant domestic worker
program in Hong Kong, see Peggy Lee and Carole J. Petersen, Forced Labour and Dept
Bondage in Hong Kong: A Study of Indonesian and Filipina Migrant Domestic Workers,
Centre for Comparative and Public Law Occasional Paper No. 11, June 2006 (available at
http://www.hku.hk/ccpl/).
34Hong Kong Government, Immigration Department, Guidebook for Employment of
Domestic Helpers from Abroad available at:
http://www.immd.gov.hk/ehtml/hkvisas 5.5.htm (visited Oct 15, 2009). For a specimen
of the standard contract see: http://www.immd.gov.hk/ehtm1/id407form.htm (visited Oct
15, 2009).
3 5Contracts processed after April 1, 2003 require newly hired migrant domestic workers
to live with their employers, in order to prevent migrant workers from competing with
local workers for "live-out" domestic positions. See Hong Kong Legislative Council,
Paper on Policy Government Employment of Foreign Domestic Helpers (July 5, 2005)
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working hours. Th e contract specifies a minimum wage and requires employers to
provide food or a food allowance, reasonable accommodation with a specified minimum
amount of space and privacy, free medical care, and one rest day each week. The contract
provides that the employee shall perform only domestic work in her employer's
household. This is partly to protect the employee (as some employers will try to
subcontract domestic workers to other households or to retail shops). However, it is also
designed to prevent migrant domestic workers from competing for jobs with local
workers.
The majority of migrant domestic workers in Hong Kong are initially recruited
and placed with an employer by an employment agency. Hong Kong employment
agencies are regulated by the section 57 of the Employment Ordinance and by
Employment Agency Regulations. The employment agency may lawfully charge a
worker a commission (a placement fee) of no more than ten percent of her first month's
salary.36 However, migrant domestic workers have frequently complained that they are
charged illegal placement fees, sometimes in their home country and sometimes after
they have arrived in Hong Kong.
The Labour Department administers Hong Kong employment law and
regulations. Both local and migrant workers are covered by local labour law, including
the Employment Ordinance, and the Employee's Compensation Ordinance. The Labour
Department has issued a Practical Guide37 to advise employers and migrant domestic
workers on their rights and duties. The Labour Relations Division provides voluntary
conciliation services for disputes relating to wages and other conditions of employment.
The Employment Claims Investigation Division investigates suspected offences and can
initiate prosecutions. 3 8 Underpayment is a considered a serious offense, as explained by
the Labour Department:
Approval for the importation of [a] foreign domestic helper is based on facts
submitted to the Director of Immigration, whereby the employer has agreed to
pay not less than the minimum allowable wage. An employer who underpays
wages as stated in the standard employment contract is liable, upon conviction, to
a maximum fine of HK$350,000 and three years' imprisonment. The employer
would also be committing serious offences of making false representation to an
available at: http://www.legco.gov.hk/vr04-05/english/panels/se/papers/se0705cb2-2116-
7e.pdf (visited Oct 15, 2009).
3 6Employment Agency Regulations, Cap. 57A, Laws of Hong Kong (1974) Regulation
10 (which refers to Part II of Schedule 2).
37See Hong Kong Government, Department of Labour, Practical Guide for Employment
ofForeign Domestic Helpers - What foreign domestic helpers and their employers should
know, available at: http://www.labour.gov.hk/eng/plan/iwFDH.htm (visited Oct 15,
2009).
38For further information on the structure and powers of the Labour Department and its
divisions see http://www.labour.gov.hk/engllabour/content.htm (visited Oct 15, 2009).
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Immigration Officer and conspiracy to defraud. Any person convicted of the
offence of conspiracy to defraud is liable to imprisonment for 14 years. 39
The law also prohibits an employer from making a deduction from a worker's
salary to pay an excessive fees demanded by employment agencies. An employer may
only make salary deductions in certain limited circumstances, such as where the
employee received an advance of wages.40
In practice, however, the legal and policy framework discourages migrant
domestic workers from filing complaints, allowing corrupt employment agencies and
employers to violate the law with little fear of prosecution. First, migrant domestic
workers are not permitted to switch employers before the end of the two-year contract
(except in unusual circumstances, such as when the employer leaves Hong Kong). This
policy is designed to prevent what government officials sometimes refer to as "job
hopping" by migrant domestic workers. (Of course, a local Hong Kong worker has a
legal right to "hop" to a new job whenever she can locate a better position.) Second, the
Hong Kong government enforces the policy by maintaining an immigration rule known
as the "two-week rule", which states that migrant domestic workers may only remain in
Hong Kong for the remainder of their "limit of stay" or for two weeks, whichever is
shorter. The two-week rule replaced an earlier practice of granting six-month renewable
work visas to migrant domestic workers and allowing them to change employers in the
second year of the contract if the employer would grant a release letter.41 Under the
current policy, if a woman or her employer terminates the two-year contract early then
she is required to return to her home country within two weeks.42 This gives the
employer the power to terminate not only the employment relationship but also the work
visa and naturally discourages workers from filing complaints about their employers.
Despite the severe consequences, a certain number of migrant women do leave
their employers and file complaints of underpayment of wages, denial of rest days, or
physical or sexual abuse. In 2005-2006, my research assistant interviewed 22 of these
women, all of whom were residing temporarily in shelters and seeking remedies from
their former employers. 43 We also interviewed additional individuals (lawyers and social
workers) who had assisted migrant domestic workers with their claims. We drew the
3 Labour Department, Practical Guide, n 37 above, p. 7.40 Ibid, p.8.
41 For a summary of the policy before 1987 see Andrew Hicks, Admission of Foreign
Domestic Helpers: Some Legal Issues, (1983) 13 HONG KONG LAW JOURNAL 194.
42 There are four possible exceptions to the "two-week rule", which can be granted at the
discretion of the Director of Immigration: (1) death of employer; 92) financial difficulty
of the employer; (3) employer has left Hong Kong; and (4) proven maltreatment.
43 1The interviews were conducted by Ms. Peggy Lee, Senior Research Assistant at the
Centre for Comparative and Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong.
Funding for the project was provided by an anonymous donation to our Equality and Law
Project, which was based in the Centre.
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following conclusions from the interviews, which we subsequently circulated to the
Hong Kong government and interested parties:
(1) Our interviewees were consistently deceived about their legal rights by
employment agencies and were not given a copy of the standard form
employment contract that they had been required to sign.
(2) All of our interviewees had been compelled to pay placement fees ranging
from HK$6,000-$21,000, well beyond the legal maximum. (The exchange rate is
roughly 7.5 HK dollars to one US dollar.)
(3) Certain employment agencies were routinely using finance companies to
disguise the placement fees as loans. The workers were then required to pay the
fees through debt bondage arrangements, with employers being directed to send
most of the monthly salary to a finance company or an agent.
(4) Many of our interviewees reported that their employers paid less than the
required minimum wage even before the illegal deductions; thus a migrant
domestic worker could be left with little or no salary for three to seven months.
(5) Passports and identity documents were routinely confiscated by certain
agencies and employers, denying the worker freedom of movement and making
her vulnerable to prosecution (as Hong Kong law requires persons to carry
identity documents).
(6) Our interviewees were often denied their full rest day (for example, they might
be required to clean a relative's apartment on Sunday or to clean the family
kitchen when they returned on Sunday evening).
(7) Interviewees often were not provided with adequate accommodation; for
example they were required to sleep on the floor or on a sofa in the living room,
which violates the standard form contract.
(8) Interviewees reported frequent threats of or actual physical abuse during their
employment.
(9) Many of interviewees told us that they did not leave their employers until the
situation became unbearable, either because they did not realize they had legal
rights or because they dreaded being returned to their home countries with no
financial profit.
(10) The interviewees from Indonesia felt particularly vulnerable, partly because
they are generally less fluent in English than Filipino workers and thus had a more
difficult time ascertaining their rights and communicating with authorities. The
Indonesian workers were also required, by their own government, to be placed by
an employment agency (whereas Filipino domestic workers could be directly
15
hired by employers, which is common after they have completed an initial two-
year contract). In theory the Indonesian government's policy was intended to
protect migrant workers. However, based upon my informal follow-up interviews
with Indonesian migrant worker organizations, there is a strongly held suspicion
that the policy was developed to benefit corrupt employment agencies.
When we publicized the preliminary results of our research, various branches of
the Hong Kong government immediately rejected our interviews as "unrepresentative".
The interviews probably are not representative of all migrant domestic workers in Hong
Kong as our interview pool consisted of women who had fled their employers and thus
were in particularly bad situations. But the stories were very similar and demonstrated a
pattern of operation that was clearly being followed by at least some corrupt employment
agencies. Even if only a small percentage of women were living in situations of debt
bondage, one would expect this to raise some alarm bells among government officials.
Some of our interviewees also gave us documents that clearly directed employers
to deduct money from a woman's salary and send it directly to the employment agency to
pay off the alleged "debt" -- which was really just an illegal placement fee. When I
mentioned this piece of evidence in an off-the-record conversation with an official from
the Hong Kong government he pointed out that we had no idea how the woman got into
debt. It was her word that the "debt" was for an illegal placement fee; the employment
agency would claim that she received training or cash in her home country and thus had
come to Hong Kong with a debt to be paid off. Hong Kong officials like to refer to this
as a "home grown" problem, meaning that it has nothing to do with Hong Kong laws or
policies. The fact that these women were trapped in situations of debt bondage in Hong
Kong and that their salaries were being diverted to a Hong Kong finance company did
not seem to worry the official.
If a migrant domestic worker does make the difficult decision to file a complaint
she generally will have to negotiate with her former employer for any remedy. This is
because the primary mechanism for resolving labor disputes in Hong Kong is voluntary
conciliation at the Labour Department's Labour Relations Division, a model that gives
considerable bargaining power to the employer. The two-week rule makes this
relationship even more unbalanced. The Immigration Department will extend a migrant
worker's visa if she has an active claim with the Labour Department but it normally
grants only short extensions, compelling the worker to pay repeated visa fees if the
dispute is not resolved quickly. This causes severe hardship, especially as the
government normally does not allow the woman to accept any paid employment while
she pursues her claim. There is a strong incentive for the worker to accept any offer from
the employer, even if it is significantly less than her legal entitlement.
Similar problems arise if a worker files a complaint with the Hong Kong Equal
Opportunities Commission (EOC) for employment discrimination or sexual harassment.
In theory, migrant domestic workers have the same rights as local workers under the
Disability Discrimination Ordinance (DDO), the Sex Discrimination Ordinance (SDO),
and the Race Discrimination Ordinance (RDO). In fact, a special provision in the SDO
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prohibits anyone who lives in the household where a migrant works from sexually
harassing her." This was included because the legislature recognized that a live-in
domestic worker might be harassed by people other than the employer (for example, the
husband or son of the employer). How ever, if a woman files a complaint against the
employer or a member of the employer's family this will certainly result in termination of
the contract, leaving the woman without a work visa and unable to support herself while
the claim is being investigated at the EOC. Like the Labour Department, the EOC
depends primarily upon voluntary conciliation to resolve complaints and this gives the
respondent a superior bargaining position.45 An employer of a migrant worker has a
particularly strong incentive to drag out the process (or to refuse to conciliate), hoping
that the migrant may give up and simply return home.
Thus, although migrant domestic workers theoretically enjoy many of the same
legal protections as local workers, in practice they will find it far more difficult to enforce
their rights. At one stage, I was hopeful that the government would amend the two-week
rule when provided with clear evidence of abuse. I even entertained hopes that the
government would find a way to take the corrupt employment agencies out of the
equation all together, perhaps by establishing a government-managed recruitment service
in certain sending countries. But the response by the government and its departments has
not been encouraging. One positive step that has been taken is that the government has
produced far more literature (and in more languages) on the rights of migrant domestic
workers. It has also prosecuted a few particularly abusive employers (one of whom
deliberately placed a hot iron on her domestic worker's hand). But the primary
governmental response has been to just repeat the stock phrase that migrant domestic
workers enjoy all the same labor rights and remedies as local workers, ignoring the
evidence that immigration rules make these rights illusory. Some women are lucky
enough to find a lawyer or other advocate who is willing to work for them on a pro-bono
basis but most seem to carry the burden on their own or have limited assistance from
fellow migrant workers. All are compelled to live on charity while pursuing their claims.
Parts of our research report have been used by migrant worker organizations in
shadow reports to UN human rights treaty bodies. The CEDAW Committee issued very
specific comments in its 2006 Concluding Observations on Hong Kong, asking that the
government repeal the two-week rule and make it easier for workers to remain in Hong
Kong while seeking redress for contractual violations. Similar recommendations have
"Sex Discrimination Ordinance, Cap. 480, Laws of Hong Kong, s. 23. For discussion of
the sexual harassment provisions and their enforcement, see Carole J. Petersen,
Negotiating Respect: Sexual Harassment and the Law in Hong Kong, (2005) 7
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 127-168.
45See Carole J. Petersen, Janice Fong, and Gabrielle Rush, ENFORCING EQUAL
OPPORTUNITIES: INVESTIGATION AND CONCILIATION OF DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINTS IN
HONG KONG (Centre for Comparative and Public Law, University of Hong Kong, 2003),
especially ch. 6; and Carole J. Petersen, Investigation and Conciliation of Employment
Discrimination Claims in the Context of Hong Kong, (2001) 5 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND
EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL 627-659.
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been made by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The most recent
criticisms were issued in August 2009, by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination. It noted:
[T]he Committee reiterates its concern ... at the situation of migrant workers, and
in particular domestic migrant workers. It notes with concern that the "two-weeks
rule" (whereby domestic migrant workers have to leave Hong Kong within two
weeks upon termination of contract) continues to be in force, as well as the live-in
requirement, and that migrant workers may be subject to longer working hours,
and shorter rest and holiday periods.
The Committee recommends that effective measures be taken to ensure that
domestic migrant workers are not discriminated against. It calls upon [sic]
repealing of the "two-weeks rule" as well as the live-in requirement and that the
State party adopt a more flexible approach to domestic migrant workers in
relation to their working conditions and work requirements, including
employment rules and practices with discriminatory purposes or effects.46
Nonetheless, the Hong Kong government has maintained a very resolute position and
staunchly defends the two-week rule, although it does not have the status of a law and
could be amended with little procedural difficulty.
Given that the government does care about its international reputation, why would
it be so unwilling to undertake a policy reform to protect this large group of women from
corruption, debt bondage, and abuse? The government's attitude is particularly baffling
in that migrant domestic workers are entirely "legal" and come to Hong Kong as part of a
government-sponsored program. They are also considered essential employees by many
households because parents work long hours in Hong Kong and there is very little public
childcare. Thus the government's lack of concern for migrant domestic workers is
probably not based on any moral "disapproval" (which may account, at least in part, for
the disregard for sex workers' safety).
But migrant domestic workers do have one thing in common with sex workers: they
are also balanced on top of an awkward political compromise, this time one with serious
economic consequences. In the past 15 years there has been rising unemployment among
middle-aged women in Hong Kong, largely because so many factories have relocated to
Mainland China. As a result, there is increased tension between those families who want
to hire a migrant domestic worker and those who view them as taking jobs away from
local women. This is one of the main reasons that the government instituted a "live-in"
requirement, whereas previously employers had the option of providing their migrant
domestic helper a stipend to rent space in a separate apartment. Migrant women often
46Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
on the People's Republic of China (including Hong Kong and Macau Special
Administrative Regions), Aug. 28, 2009, para 30.
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preferred this arrangement as it gave them more independence and space from their
employers. It also greatly reduced the chance of sexual harassment as the worker was not
obligated to bathe and sleep in the employer's home. But, by requiring migrant domestic
helpers to live with their employers, the government helps to ensure that local domestic
helpers (who also generally prefer to live with their own families) have no foreign
competition in that particular market.
If the government were to empower the migrant domestic workers by relaxing any
of the restrictions on them (e.g. the two-week rule or the live-in requirement) then it
would very likely attract criticism from some local labor groups. It must also be
acknowledged that families who employ migrant domestic workers have little incentive
to strengthen the bargaining position of their employees. Although they may not wish to
admit it, many employers are probably quite happy to have the two-week rule in place.
V. Conclusions
It is not just the "private nature" of their work that makes sex workers and
migrant domestic workers particularly vulnerable to violence. The Hong Kong legal
system pushes them into situations of heightened danger, denying them the agency that
all women deserve in their workplaces and homes. The government's reluctance to make
even small changes to these laws and policies (in an era of substantial law reform in
Hong Kong) indicates that multiple forms of discrimination are operating here. However,
the treatment of these women probably cannot be explained as simply the product of
prejudice. The fact that the government recently proposed to extend the Domestic
Violence Ordinance to include same-sex couples (although it has long opposed same-sex
marriage and has been taken to court more than once for sexuality discrimination)
indicates that the government is can move beyond prejudices when it comes to safety
issues. For some reason, however, the safety of sex workers and migrant domestic
workers has not yet risen to the top of the agenda.
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